Took a bunch of notes today and I figured my readers would be able to benefit from them as well.

The Lessons Learned listed below are mainly for Emergency Responders and Emergency Management Professionals.

Sandy Hook Elementary shooting Lessons Learned:
1. Cell phone calls will exponentially outnumber landline calls during major emergencies.
2. Media inundated dispatch center w/ confirmation requests. Have script ready for dispatchers. Empower dispatchers.
3. Local PIO will be overwhelmed by non-stop phone calls alone. Must engage other regional PIOs IMMEDIATELY.
4. Credentialing was a huge issue esp w/ self dispatched resources. EMs must work to coordinate the All-Hazard responders.
5. Referencing Newtown Bee: Your local media will ALWAYS be there. Even after situation is over, your local news will be there.
6. Used ESF-3 Public Works to help corral national/international media. Also to maintain/takedown makeshift memorials.
7. Within 20 minutes, Newtown Bank setup donations clearing house with UnitedWay. Donations Management = Emergency Management
8. All reimbursements was fulfilled thanks to the FSC’s documentation. ICS works. Period.

Boston Fire Department’s Boston bombing notes:
1. Initial assessment of Boston Bombing’s scene size-up was SO important for all initial responders and inbound resources
2. “Not opening an EOC was a big mistake” – Boston Fire DC
3. Instantaneous access to initial Boston bombing blast site was key in triage and size of MCI on resource allocation
4. Boston bomb squads use of water cannon caused major problems w/ other response agencies
5. Responder accountability didn’t happen until 1.5 hours post blast. BFD didn’t know if Firefighters has died in explosion due to response
6. Interagency comms channel-14 wasn’t used during initial response of Boston bombing. Agencies did their own thing on their own radio sysetms
7. Before any Firefighters demobed from Boston bombing scene, Command setup CISM at Boston Fire Engine-7s quarters.
8. A makeshift EOC was finally setup in the Westin lobby to meet the IAP for Boston Marathon response.
9. Various Boston Marathon IAPs from different municipalities never coordinated w/ each other. New IAPs have multiagency coordination.
10. Lessons Learned Boston Bombing: All agencies MUST increase Liaison positions to facilitate all-hazard response and comms coordination
11. Lessons learned: Co-locating decon with medical tent and redundant air monitoring systems must be part of IAP for next Boston Marathon.
12. Lessons learned: Post Boston Bombing: Methodical reentry plans for local biz and COOP must be used/ready

13. Lesson learned: Involve your local utilities in your IAP. During an emergency/disaster – they will likely be part of your response/recovery

14. Boston Fire Lessons learned: Continue to conduct multi-agency exercises to increase better all-hazards response

@rusnivek